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Can	Parliament	be	scared	into	submission	over	the
Brexit	deal?
As	agreement	is	reached	with	the	EU,	Theresa	May’s	Brexit	deal	will	come	before	Parliament.	In
this	blog,	Benjamin	Martill	(LSE)	breaks	down	the	parliamentary	arithmetic	and	assesses	her
options.
My	Kingdom	for	a	Deal
Theresa	May	has,	at	long	last,	reached	agreement	with	the	EU	on	the	terms	of	Britain’s	impending
withdrawal	from	the	Union	on	29	March	2019.	Although	details	of	the	deal	are	hazy	at	the	moment,	most	sources
indicate	it	loosely	follows	the	logic	of	the	infamous	Chequers	Agreement	presented	to	the	Cabinet	in	July.	It	would
see	the	UK	remain	within	a	single	customs	territory	with	the	EU,	precluding	the	need	for	a	hard	border	on	the	island
of	Ireland.	Northern	Ireland	would	also	remain	in	key	elements	of	the	single	market	for	goods,	for	the	same	reason.
This	‘backstop’	has	proven	to	be	the	most	contentious	element	of	the	Withdrawal	Agreement,	dragging	out
negotiations	which	were	almost	80	percent	complete	at	the	beginning	of	2018.
The	agreement	would	also	provide	for	a	reasonably	generous	agreement	on	citizens’	rights,	British	contributions	to
the	EU	budget	to	the	tune	of	£39	billion,	as	well	as	a	21-month	transition	period,	during	which	the	UK	will	remain
subject	to	EU	rules	but	cease	to	be	represented	in	the	institutions.
The	deal	represents	a	milestone	in	many	ways,	not	least	since	the	two	sides	in	the	talks	have	seemed	quite	far	apart
and	rumours	were	rife	that	the	government	would	fall	before	a	deal	could	be	reached.	But	May	should	not	count	her
chickens	yet	(chlorinated	or	otherwise).
Reaching	agreement	with	the	EU	on	the	terms	of	withdrawal	was	always	going	to	be	the	easy	part,	not	least	given
the	amount	of	ground	the	UK	has	given	in	the	negotiations	so	far,	and	the	dearth	of	concessions	offered	by	the	EU	in
relation	to	British	demands.	Far	more	tricky	will	be	obtaining	the	necessary	support	of	the	British	parliament,	which
must	consent	to	the	final	agreement	in	the	‘meaningful	vote’	promised	by	May	in	June.	In	this	regard,	it	is	instructive
to	consider	what	the	different	constituencies	in	the	British	Parliament	have	at	stake,	how	they	are	likely	to	vote,	and
how	this	will	affect	May’s	parliamentary	calculus.
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Few	MPs	support	May’s	deal	for	what	it	is—a	messy	compromise	amounting	to	the	worst	of	both	worlds	that	cannot
but	displease	Leavers	and	Remainers	alike.	Rather,	they	will	support	it	if	they	feel	it	is	the	least-worst	option,	or
because	they	feel	offering	or	withholding	support	will	create	favourable	circumstances	in	other	respects.	Much	hinges
on	whether	rejection	of	the	deal	increases	the	likelihood	of	a	harder	Brexit	(including	the	no	deal	scenario),	whether	it
challenges	Brexit	and	forces	a	re-think,	and	whether	it	will	result	in	a	general	election	(and	a	shot	at	power	for	the
opposition).
To	her	party	faithful,	a	combination	of	Remain-	and	moderate-Leave	supporting	Tory	MPs,	May	must	stress	the	risk
of	a	no	deal	scenario	and	the	possibility	of	a	Labour	government.	To	the	small	but	potentially	significant	number	of
Remain-supporting	Tory	rebels—including	Kenneth	Clarke,	Anna	Soubry,	and	as	many	as	20	others	if	past	votes	are
anything	to	go	by—she	must	also	stress	the	risk	of	a	no	deal	Brexit	or	a	harder	Brexit	under	her	would-be
successors.
To	the	40	or	so	Brexit-supporting	members	of	the	European	Research	Group	(ERG),	as	well	as	supporters	of	former
Cabinet	colleagues	Boris	Johnson	and	David	Davis,	she	must	emphasise	the	risk	to	Brexit	itself	of	rejecting	the	deal.
In	essence,	her	message	to	this	group	must	be	that	Brexit	will	not	be	realised	if	her	withdrawal	agreement	does	not
pass.	She	can	also	hope	to	obtain	the	support	of	this	group	by	citing	the	spectre	of	a	Labour	government,	whose
version	of	Brexit,	she	could	legitimately	claim,	would	also	be	far	softer	than	the	ERG	preference.
To	Labour	MPs,	many	of	whom	are	Remain	supporters,	the	prime	minister	must	cite	both	the	likelihood	of	a	harder
Brexit	and	make	it	clear	a	general	election	would	not	be	in	the	offing	if	the	agreement	were	to	fail.	If	Labour	MPs	can
be	persuaded	that	the	withdrawal	agreement	offers	the	most	realistic	chance	to	avert	a	no	deal	Brexit,	and	that
Labour	could	not	come	to	power	off	the	back	of	its	rejection,	then	a	number	may	be	prepared	to	defy	the	party	whip
and	vote	with	the	government.	The	party	firmly	denies	this,	but	it	cannot	be	ruled	out,	not	least	because	of	divisions
within	Labour	ranks	(occluded	only	because	the	Conservatives	are	even	more	divided).
With	respect	to	her	coalition	colleagues,	the	Brexit-supporting	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(DUP),	May	has	relatively
few	options.	She	can	argue	that	Brexit	will	not	happen	at	all,	but	this	would	likely	be	of	secondary	concern	to	the
party’s	overall	preference	of	keeping	Northern	Ireland	undifferentiated	from	the	UK.	May	cannot	threaten	the	DUP
with	the	loss	of	(real)	power,	nor	can	she	threaten	that	Labour’s	Brexit	plans	would	thwart	unionist	ambitions,	since
these	involve	continued	membership	of	the	customs	union	for	the	whole	UK.	In	the	end,	the	DUP	will	not	prove	as
pivotal	as	first	thought,	given	the	incentives	for	MPs	in	other	parties	to	cross	the	aisle,	as	well	as	the	serious	risk	of
revolt	within	May’s	own	party.
Deal	or	No	Deal
The	real	challenge	for	May	is	to	make	any	of	these	potentialities	credible	in	light	of	the	multiple	possibilities	she
herself	has	cited	in	recent	weeks.	Unless	she	can	convince	every	group	that	their	worst	fears	will	be	realised	should
they	reject	the	deal,	the	vote	on	the	withdrawal	agreement	will	fail.	But	tactics	meant	to	scare	some	audiences	will
enable	revolt	in	others:	the	more	May	doubles	down	on	the	risk	of	a	no	deal	or	hard	Brexit	to	court	Remain-
supporting	MPs,	the	more	hard-line	Conservatives	will	be	prepared	to	defy	the	government	whip;	the	more	she	cites
the	risk	of	a	Labour	government,	the	less	likely	it	is	that	any	Labour	MPs	will	come	to	her	aid;	the	more	she	raises	the
prospect	of	Brexit	not	happening	at	all,	the	more	Remain-supporting	MPs	will	seek	to	oppose	the	withdrawal
agreement.
If	any	of	these	constituencies	withdraws	their	support,	the	agreement	will	fail.
In	the	end,	the	prime	minister	may	just	pull	it	off.	She	may	succeed	in	convincing	each	group	that	the	alternative	is	far
worse.	Either	way,	the	vote	is	not	going	to	be	easy,	and	if	the	agreement	does	pass,	it	will	likely	be	with	a	razor-thin
majority,	which	will	do	little	to	legitimise	the	deal	and	much	to	ensure	that	political	divisions	will	continue	to	play	out
as	the	future	relationship	is	negotiated.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	neither	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	nor	of	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared
on	the	Dahrendorf	Forum	blog.
Benjamin	Martill	is	a	Dahrendorf	Forum	Post-Doctoral	Fellow	at	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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